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This paper discusses the recurrence and the recurrent limitations of liberalism as a 
general discourse, strategy, and regime. It then establishes a continuum of 
neoliberalism ranging from a project for radical system transformation from state 
socialism to market capitalism, through a basic regime shift within capitalism, to more 
limited policy adjustments intended to maintain another type of accumulation regime 
and its mode of regulation. These last two forms of neoliberalism are then related to a 
broader typology of approaches to the restructuring, rescaling, and reordering 
accumulation and regulation in advanced capitalist societies: neoliberalism, 
neocorporatism, neostatism, and neocommunitarianism. These arguments are 
illustrated in the final part of the paper through a critique of the World Report on the 
Urban Future (1999) both as an explicit attempt to promote flanking and supporting 
measures to sustain the neoliberal project on the urban scale and as an implicit attempt 
to naturalise that project on a global scale. 
 
The novelty of recent neoliberal projects lies in their discursive, strategic, and 
organizational reformulation of liberalism in response to three recent developments: the 
increasing internationalization and/or globalization of economies; the interconnected 
crises of the mixed economy and the Keynesian welfare national state associated with 
Atlantic Fordism, of the guided economy and developmental state in East Asia, and of 
the collapse of the Soviet bloc; and the rise of new social movements in response to the 
economic, political, and social changes associated with the preceding two changes. 
Although neoliberal projects are being pursued on many different and often tangled 
scales, it is in cities and city-regions that the various contradictions and tensions of 
“actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore this volume) are expressed 
most saliently in everyday life. It is also on this scale that one can find major attempts to 
manage these contradictions and tensions in the hope of consolidating the neoliberal 
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turn through supplementary and/or flanking strategies and policies. 
 
Liberalism and Neoliberalism 
 
Liberalism is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. It is: a polyvalent conceptual 
ensemble in economic, political, and ideological discourse; a strongly contested 
strategic concept for restructuring market-state relations with many disputes over its 
scope, application, and limitations; and a recurrent yet historically variable pattern of 
economic, political, and social organization in modern societies. Liberalism rarely, if 
ever, exists in pure form; it typically coexists with elements from other discourses, 
strategies, and organizational patterns. Thus, it is better seen as one set of elements in 
the repertoire of Western economic, political and ideological discourse than as a 
singular, univocal, and internally coherent discourse in its own right. Likewise, it is better 
seen as a more or less significant principle of economic, political, and social 
organization in a broader institutional configuration than as a self-consistent, self-
sufficient, and eternally reproducible organizational principle. Thus, the meaning and 
import of liberalism can vary considerably. It can be a hegemonic or dominant theme in 
some periods and movements, subaltern or subordinate in others. In addition, the actual 
practices of self-described liberal (or neoliberal) regimes may depart significantly from 
underlying ideologies and programs. 
Ideologically, liberalism claims that economic, political, and social relations are 
best organized through formally free1 choices of formally free and rational actors who 
seek to advance their own material or ideal interests in an institutional framework that, 
by accident or design, maximizes the scope for formally free choice. Economically, it 
endorses expansion of the market economy—that is, spreading the commodity form to 
all factors of production (including labor power) and formally free, monetized exchange 
to as many social practices as possible. Politically, it implies that collective 
decisionmaking should involve a constitutional state with limited substantive powers of 
economic and social intervention, and a commitment to maximizing the formal freedom 
of actors in the economy and the substantive freedom of legally recognized subjects in 
the public sphere. The latter is based in turn on spontaneous freedom of association of 
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individuals to pursue any social activities that are not forbidden by constitutionally valid 
laws. These three principles may conflict regarding the scope of anarchic market 
relations, collective decisionmaking, and spontaneous self-organization as well as the 
formal and substantive freedoms available to economic, legal, and civil subjects. And, 
as Marx (1996:243) noted, “Where equal rights exist, force decides.” In other words, 
within the matrix of liberal principles, the relative balance of economic, political, and 
civic liberalism depends on the changing balance of forces within an institutionalized 
(but changeable) compromise. 
As a new economic project oriented to new conditions, neoliberalism calls for: the 
liberalization and deregulation of economic transactions, not only within national borders 
but also—and more importantly—across these borders; the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises and state-provided services; the use of market proxies in the residual public 
sector; and the treatment of public welfare spending as a cost of international 
production, rather than as a source of domestic demand (see below). As a political 
project, it seeks to roll back “normal” (or routine) forms of state intervention associated 
with the mixed economy and the Keynesian welfare national state (or analogous forms 
of intervention in the developmental state or socialist plan state) as well as the 
“exceptional” (or crisis-induced) forms of intervention aimed at managing, displacing, or 
deferring crises in and/or of accumulation regimes and their modes of regulation in 
Atlantic Fordism, East Asia, and elsewhere. It also involves enhanced state intervention 
to roll forward new forms of governance (including state intervention) that are 
purportedly more suited to a market-driven (and, more recently, also allegedly 
knowledge-driven) globalizing economy. This typically involves the selective transfer of 
state capacities upwards, downwards, and sideways, as intervention is rescaled in the 
hope of securing conditions for a smoothly operating world market and to promote 
supply-side competitiveness on various scales above and below the national level. 
Urban and regional governments and growth coalitions may gain a key role as strategic 
partners of business in this changed context. A shift also occurs from government to 
market forces and partnership-based forms of governance, reflecting the neoliberal 
belief in the probability, if not inevitability, of state failure and/or the need to involve 
relevant stakeholders in supply-side policies. And policy regimes are internationalized 
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under the aegis of the institutions of the neo-liberal Washington Consensus promoted 
by the U.S. government and leading international economic organizations in the hope of 
harmonizing (if not standardizing) economic and social policy and their supporting 
institutions so that the liberal world market can work more effectively (on this and other 
readings of the Washington Consensus, see Williamson 2000). The economic, social, 
and political measures pursued in support of the neoliberal project generally seem to 
involve a paradoxical increase in intervention. However, neoliberals claim this is 
temporary and legitimate, for, after a brief transitional period, the state can retreat to its 
proper, minimal role, acting only to secure the conditions for the continued expansion of 
the liberal market economy and a self-organizing civil society (the illusory nature of this 
claim is illustrated by the contributions of Jones, Keil, and Peck and Tickell to this 
volume). Finally, as a project to reorganize civil society, neoliberalism is linked to a 
wider range of political subjects than is typical of orthodox liberalism. It also tends to 
promote “community” (or a plurality of self-organizing communities) as a flanking, 
compensatory mechanism for the inadequacies of the market mechanism. This is yet 
another area where cities or city-regions acquire significance in the neoliberal project, 
since they are major sites of civic initiative as well as of the accumulating economic and 
social tensions associated with neoliberal projects. 
The resurgence of liberalism in the form of neoliberalism is often attributed to a 
successful hegemonic project voicing the interests of financial and/or transnational 
capital. Its recent hegemony in neoliberal regimes undoubtedly depends on the 
successful exercise of political, intellectual, and moral leadership in response to the 
crisis of Atlantic Fordism—a crisis that the rise of neoliberalism and neoliberal policies 
has exacerbated. However, its resonance is also rooted in the nature of capitalist social 
formations. Liberalism can be seen as a more or less “spontaneous philosophy” within 
capitalist societies—that is, as a seemingly natural, almost self-evident economic, 
political, and social imaginary that corresponds to specific features of bourgeois society. 
In particular, it is consistent with four such features.  
The first of these is the institution of private property—that is, the juridical fiction 
of “private” ownership and control of the factors of production. This encourages 
individual property owners and those who dispose over fictitious commodities such as 
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labor-power and natural resources to see themselves as entitled to use or alienate their 
property as they think fit, without due regard to the substantive interdependence of 
activities in a market economy and market society. In this realm “rule Freedom, 
Equality, Property and Bentham, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of 
labor-power, are constrained only by their own free will” (Marx 1996:186). Second, and 
relatedly, there is the appearance of “free choice” in consumption, where those with 
sufficient money choose what to buy and how to dispose over it. Third, the institutional 
separation and operational autonomies of the economy and state make the latter’s 
interventions appear as external intrusions into the activities of otherwise free economic 
agents. This may initially be an unwelcome but necessary extraeconomic condition for 
orderly free markets, but if pushed beyond this minimum night-watchman role it appears 
as an obstacle to free markets and/or as direct political oppression. Fourth, there is the 
closely related institutional separation of civil society and the state. This encourages the 
belief that state intervention is an intrusion into the formally free choices of particular 
members of civil society once the conditions for social order have been established.  
Opposition to liberalism may also emerge “spontaneously” on the basis of four 
other features of capitalist social relations that are closely related to the former set. 
First, growing socialization of the forces of production despite continued private 
ownership of the means of production suggests the need for ex ante collaboration 
among producer groups to limit market anarchy, through top-down planning and/or 
various forms of self-organization. Second, there are the strategic dilemmas posed by 
the shared interests of producers (including wage-earners) in maximizing total revenues 
through cooperation and their divided and potentially conflictual interests over how 
these revenues are distributed. Various nonmarket governance mechanisms have a 
role here helping to balance cooperation and conflict. Third, there are the contradictions 
and conflicts posed by the coexistence of the institutional separation and mutual 
dependence of the economic and state systems. This leads to different logics of 
economic and political action, at the same time as it generates a need to consult on the 
economic impact of state policies and/or on the political repercussions of private 
economic decisionmaking. And fourth, there are problems generated by the nature of 
civil society as a sphere of particular interests opposed to the state’s supposed 
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embodiment of universal interests. This indicates the need for some institutional means 
of mediating the particular and universal and, since this is impossible in the abstract, for 
some hegemonic definition of the “general interest” (on the always imperfect, 
strategically selective nature of such reconciliations, see Jessop 1990). 
This suggests that, if liberalism can be interpreted as a more or less 
“spontaneous philosophy” rooted in capitalist social relations, one should also recognize 
that it is prone to “spontaneous combustion” due to tensions inherent in these same 
relations. This was noted in Polanyi’s critique of late nineteenth-century liberalism, 
which argued that, in response to crisis-tendencies in laissez-faire capitalism, many 
social forces struggled to re-embed and re-regulate the market. The eventual 
compromise solution was a market economy embedded in and sustained by a market 
society (Polanyi 1944). The same point applies to neoliberal capitalism. Thus, after the 
efforts of “roll-back neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell this volume) to free the neoliberal 
market economy from its various corporatist and statist impediments, attempts are now 
being made to secure its medium-term viability by embedding it in a neoliberal market 
society. This involves measures to displace or defer contradictions and conflicts beyond 
the spatiotemporal horizons of a given regime, as well as supplementary measures to 
flank, support, and sustain the continued dominance of the neoliberal project within 
these horizons (on the key concept of “spatiotemporal fix” in this regard, see Jessop 
2001). 
This line of argument should not be restricted to liberalism and neoliberalism, for 
the other modes of governance characteristic of capitalist social formations are also 
contradictory and tension-ridden. Indeed, there are strange complementarities here. On 
the one hand, while liberalism tends to regenerate itself “spontaneously” on the basis of 
key features of capitalist societies, this regeneration meets obstacles from some of the 
other key features of such societies. On the other hand, while the latter provide the 
basis for the resurgence of other discourses, strategies, and organizational paradigms, 
such as corporatism or statism, their realization tends to be fettered in turn by the 
features that generate liberalism. Overall, these mutually related tendencies and 
countertendencies produce oscillations in the relative weight of different kinds of co-
ordination and modes of policymaking.  
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This said, different principles of governance seem more or less well suited to 
different stages of capitalism and/or its contemporary variants. Thus, liberalism was 
probably more suited to the pioneering forms of competitive capitalism than to later 
forms—though Polanyi and others would note that it has clear limitations even for 
competitive capitalism—and it is more suited to uncoordinated than coordinated market 
economies, for which statism and corporatism are better (see Coates 2000; Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001). Thus, different stages and forms of 
capitalism may have distinctive institutional attractors (or centres of gravity) around 
which oscillation occurs. This makes it imperative to study “actually existing 
neoliberalisms” to understand how their dynamic and viability are shaped by specific 
path-dependent contexts, competing discourses, strategies, and organizational 
paradigms, and the balance of forces associated with different projects.  
 
The Neoliberal Turn and Its Implications  
 
The initial rise of neoliberalism as a wide-ranging economic and political strategy was 
associated with the neoliberal regime shift in Britain and the US in the late 1970s. This 
reflects the fact that their uncoordinated market economies were less well equipped 
organizationally and institutionally than were coordinated economies to manage the 
crisis-tendences of Atlantic Fordism, and that they provided more fertile ground for the 
rise of neoliberalism. This was followed by similar shifts in Canada, New Zealand, and 
Australia, with New Zealand showing, in many ways, the least impure form of 
neoliberalism. An increasing number of coordinated economies (including the so-called 
“Rhenish” cases and the social democratic economies of Scandinavia) initiated 
neoliberal policy adjustments during the 1980s and continued them into the 1990s. 
Then, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989–1990, Western neoliberal forces and 
international institutions under US leadership (with strong British backing) launched their 
program for a neoliberal system transformation for the postsocialist economies in 
Eastern and Central Europe, with rather equivocal (or cynically opportunistic) support 
from domestic nomenklatura capitalists. Given the political, intellectual, and moral 
climate from the late 1970s to early 1990s and the dominance—if not hegemony—of a 
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transatlantic neoliberal power bloc, such disparate sets of changes were often lumped 
together and misinterpreted (enthusiastically or despairingly) as proof of the general 
triumph of neoliberalism. (See Table 1 for these different degrees or forms of 
neoliberalism.)  
However, this impression was seriously misleading, since it failed to distinguish 
the different forms and degrees of neoliberalism, even in this heady period, and ignored 
the extent to which each of its three types was subject to challenge and prone to failure. 
Thus, major alternatives to neoliberal system transformation were already being 
promoted in the 1990s. These included Germany’s attempt to mould postsocialism by 
integrating its eastern neighbors and the Balkans into an expanded German economic 
bloc reminiscent in scope (but not methods of coordination) of the fascist 
Großraumwirtschaft (large space economy), and Sweden’s efforts to extend its social 
democratic model into the postsocialist societies and create a Baltic Sea economic 
region. Moreover, outside Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, the 
much-hyped transformation increasingly took the form of a parasitic nomenklatura 
capitalism presiding over a generalised economic collapse. Meanwhile, capitalist 
societies undertaking a neoliberal regime shift also began to face problems in the 1990s 
with their pursuit of pure market forces and promoted a “Third Way” to support and flank 
their own neoliberal projects. This is the significance of Major (and then Blair) in Britain 
and of Clinton in the USA (on New Labor’s urban policy in this respect, see Jones and 
Ward’s contribution to this volume).  
Conversely, those economies that embarked on neoliberal policy adjustment 
rarely moved on to a neoliberal regime shift. Indeed, attempts to do so were rejected by 
electors and/or opposed by leading economic and political forces with vested interests 
in maintaining the prevailing production regimes. Here, adjustment took the form of 
rolling back the exceptional (or crisis-induced) aspects of state intervention that had 
been introduced to displace or defer Atlantic Fordism’s crisis-tendencies in favor of 
neoliberal measures to reduce inflation and government deficits. However, there has 
been no comparable roll-back of the normal (routine) forms of intervention associated 
with the postwar mode of growth. Instead, they have been modified to promote greater 
flexibility and innovation and to reinforce the welfare state’s role in aiding adjustment to 
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global pressures in small open economies. This is reflected in the greater continuity in 
institutions and modes of policymaking, even as distinctive national variants of a new 
mode of regulation are emerging with a mix of neostatist, neocorporatist, and some 
neoliberal features (see below). 
 
Looking Beyond Neoliberalism to Interpret Recent Changes 
If the above account is correct, one should not conflate the global neoliberal turn with 
the broader set of recent changes in economic, political, and social life. For, although 
the rise of neoliberal discourse and the pursuit of neoliberal strategies has helped to 
shape the form and content of these changes, the latter have more general (and 
deeper) roots in the broader political economy of Atlantic Fordism and its articulation 
with the wider world system and have also prompted responses quite different from the 
attempt to establish a global neoliberal market economy. Various labels have been 
proposed by different theoretical approaches to describe these changes, and no single 
approach could hope to capture them in all their complexity. This is certainly not my aim 
here. Instead I want to explore the value of a state-theoretical regulationist approach to 
some changes that affect capital accumulation and its regulation in North America, 
Europe, and Australasia. In particular, I suggest that these changes can be analyzed in 
terms of the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime (or SWPR). 
This regime has four key features that distinguish it in ideal-typical terms from the 
Keynesian Welfare National State (or KWNS). First, it seeks to promote international 
competitiveness and sociotechnical innovation through supply-side policies in relatively 
open economies. Thus, with Keynes’s symbolic dethronement, today’s emblematic 
economist is Schumpeter, the theorist of innovation, enterprise, long waves of 
technological change, and creative destruction (on this last aspect, see Brenner and 
Theodore in this issue). The economic policy emphasis now falls on innovation and 
competitiveness, rather than on full employment and planning. Second, social policy is 
being subordinated to economic policy, so that labor markets become more flexible and 
downward pressure is placed on a social wage that is now considered as a cost of 
production rather than a means of redistribution and social cohesion. In general, the aim 
here is to get people from welfare into work, rather than resort to allegedly 
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unsustainable welfare expenditures, and, in addition, to create enterprising subjects and 
overturn a culture of dependency. Third, the importance of the national scale of 
policymaking and implementation is being seriously challenged, as local, regional, and 
supranational levels of government and social partnership gain new powers. This is 
reflected in the concern to find creative “postnational” solutions to current economic, 
political, social, and environmental problems, rather than relying primarily on national 
institutions and networks. The urban level is important here for economic and social 
policy. And, fourth, there is growing reliance on partnership, networks, consultation, 
negotiation, and other forms of reflexive self-organization, rather than on the 
combination of anarchic market forces and top-down planning associated with the 
postwar “mixed economy” or on the old tripartite corporatist arrangements based on a 
producers’ alliance between big business, big labor, and the national state.  
There are various forms of the SWPR, different routes can be taken towards 
them, and there are significant path-dependent as well as path-shaping aspects to 
trajectories and outcomes alike. A neoliberal regime shift is only one of many 
possibilities. To facilitate a comparative analysis of “actually existing” neoliberalization 
(Peck and Tickell this volume), it is useful to contrast neoliberalism with three other 
ideal-typical strategies that can lead from some form of the KWNS to some form of the 
SWPR: neocorporatism, neostatism, and neocommunitarianism. Before elaborating on 
these particular concepts in more detail, however, I will explain the general theoretical 
purposes of ideal types and their possible role(s) in empirical analysis. 
Ideal types are so called because they involve thought experiments, not because 
they represent some normative ideal or other. They are theoretical constructs formed by 
the one-sided accentuation of empirically observable features of social reality to 
produce logically coherent and objectively feasible configurations of social relations. 
These configurations are never found in pure form, but their conceptual construction 
may still be useful for heuristic, descriptive, and explanatory purposes. The four variants 
of the SWPR are constructed around six interdependent, partly overlapping aspects of 
economic regulation. These comprise: the dominant form of competition; the form and 
extent of external regulation of private economic actors; the size of the public sector; the 
form and extent of state-owned production of goods and services; the articulation 
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between national economies and the state’s role in managing international economic 
relations; and the tax regime. However, given this interdependence and overlap, the six 
features listed for each ideal type are not exactly equivalent. Seeking complete 
equivalence would privilege one type (probably neoliberalism) as the benchmark for 
comparison and so risk losing sense what gives each type its own distinctive 
coherence. The prefix “neo” highlights important discontinuities with the liberal, 
corporatist, and statist variants of the KWNS linked to Fordism and/or their 
contemporary communitarian alternatives. While specific economic, political, and 
intellectual forces are often closely identified with one or other response, the types are 
best seen as poles around which different solutions could develop. Each has 
contrasting implications for economic and social policy. Individual mixes depend on 
institutional legacies, the balance of political forces, and the changing economic and 
political conjunctures in which different strategies are pursued. The four types are 
presented in summary in Table 2 and elaborated in the following paragraphs. 
Neoliberalism promotes market-led economic and social restructuring. In the 
public sector, this involves privatization, liberalization, and imposition of commercial 
criteria in the residual state sector; in the private sector, deregulation is backed by a 
new juridicopolitical framework that offers passive support for market solutions. This is 
reflected in: government measures to promote “hire-and-fire,” flexitime, and flexiwage 
labor markets; growth of tax expenditures steered by private initiatives based on fiscal 
subsidies for favored economic activities; measures to turn welfare states into means of 
supporting and subsidizing low wages and/or to enhance the disciplinary force of social 
security measures and programs; and a more general reorientation of economic and 
social policy to the private sector’s “needs.” In addition, social partnership is disavowed 
in favor of managerial prerogatives, market forces, and a strong state. Neoliberals also 
support free trade and capital mobility. They expect innovation to follow spontaneously 
from freeing entrepreneurs and workers to seize market opportunities in a state-
sponsored enterprise culture.  
Neocorporatism involves a negotiated approach to restructuring by private, 
public, and third-sector actors and aims to balance competition and cooperation. It is 
based on commitment to social accords as well as the pursuit of private economic 
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interests in securing the stability of a socially embedded, socially regulated economy. 
However, whilst Atlantic Fordist corporatism involved cooperation between big 
business, mass unions, and an interventionist state to promote full employment and 
overcome stagflation, neocorporatism reflects the diversity of policy communities and 
networks relevant to innovation-driven growth, as well as the increasing heterogeneity 
of labor forces and labor markets. It is also more directly and explicitly oriented to 
innovation and competitiveness. Thus, neocorporatist networks include policy 
communities representing functional systems (eg science, health, and education), and 
policy implementation becomes more flexible through the extension of “regulated self-
regulation” and public-private partnerships. Compliance with state policies is voluntary 
or depends on self-regulating corporatist organizations endowed with public status. 
And—whether at local, national, or supranational level—states use their resources to 
support decisions reached through corporatist negotiation. Corporatist arrangements 
may also become more selective (eg excluding some entrenched industrial interests 
and marginal workers, integrating some “sunrise” sectors and privileging core workers); 
and, reflecting the greater flexibility and decentralization of the post-Fordist economy, 
the centers of neocorporatist gravity shifts to firms and localities and away from 
centralized macroeconomic concertation.  
Neostatism involves a market-conforming but state-sponsored approach to 
economic and social restructuring whereby the state seeks to guide market forces in 
support of a national economic strategy. This guidance depends heavily on the state’s 
deployment of its own powers of imperative co-ordination, its own economic resources 
and activities, and its own knowledge bases and organizational intelligence. Compared 
with the statist form of the KWNS, however, there is a changed understanding of 
international competition. This is a Schumpeterian view based on dynamic competitive 
advantage rather than Ricardian static comparative advantage or Listian dynamic 
growth based on catch-up investment in a protected, mercantilist economy. There is a 
mixture of state-driven decommodification, state-sponsored flexibility, and other state 
activities to secure the dynamic efficiency and synergistic coherence of a core 
productive economy. This is reflected in an active structural policy that sets strategic 
targets relating to new technologies, technology transfer, innovation systems, 
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infrastructure, and other factors affecting international competitiveness broadly 
understood. The state also favours an active labor market policy to re-skill labor power 
and encourages a flexiskill rather than flexiprice labor market. It guides private-public 
partnerships to ensure that they serve public as well as private interests. Whilst the 
central state retains key strategic roles, parallel and complementary activities are also 
encouraged at regional and/or local levels. However, the central state’s desire to protect 
the core technological and economic competencies of its productive base is often 
associated with neomercantilism at the supranational level. 
Neocommunitarianism is a fourth approach to building an SWPR. It emphasizes 
the contribution of the “third sector” and/or the “social economy” (both located between 
market and state) to economic development and social cohesion, as well as the role of 
grassroots (or bottom-up) economic and social mobilization in developing and 
implementing economic strategies. It also emphasizes: the link between economic and 
community development, notably in empowering citizens and community groups; the 
contribution that greater self-sufficiency can make to reinserting marginalized local 
economies into the wider economy: and the role of decentralized partnerships that 
embrace not only the state and business interests but also diverse community 
organizations and other local stakeholders. The neocommunitarian strategy focuses on 
less competitive economic spaces (such as inner cities, deindustrializing cities, or cities 
at the bottom of urban hierarchies) with the greatest risk of losing from the zero-sum 
competition for external resources. Against the logic of a globalizing capitalism, the 
social economy prioritizes social use-value. It aims to redress the imbalance between 
private affluence and public poverty, to create local demand, to re-skill the long-term 
unemployed and reintegrate them into an expanded labor market, to address some of 
the problems of urban regeneration (eg in social housing, insulation, and energy-
saving), to provide a different kind of spatiotemporal fix for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, to regenerate trust within the community, and to promote empowerment. 
This involves co-ordinated economic and social strategies across various scales of 
action and, ideally, a minimum income guarantee—whether as citizens’ wage, basic 
income, or carers’ allowances. 
The changes associated with these different strategies typically involve some 
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rescaling of the mode of economic regulation. Nonetheless, different strategies may be 
pursued on different scales. For example, a retreat of state intervention at the national 
level may be linked to its rolling forward at local or supranational levels (cf Gough and 
Eisenschitz 1996). This has obvious implications for the urban level, where key issues 
of competitiveness, labor market flexibility, and social policy intersect, and where new 
supply-side orientations may permit differential economic and social policies and 
perhaps—notably under neoliberalism—encourage uneven development. Thus, even 
where both the national and international levels are dominated by attempts to promote a 
neoliberal regime shift, the urban level may be characterized more by neocorporatism, 
neostatism, and neocommunitarianism. Indeed this last pattern is particularly linked to 
attempts to manage issues of social exclusion and social cohesion at the urban level 
even in the most strongly neoliberal cases. The resurgence—or (in southern Europe) 
the emergence—of “social pacts” in European Union member states also reflects the 
multiscalar nature of the changing world economy and its repercussions on national 
economic and social policy (on social pacts, see Ebbinghaus and Hassel 1999; Grote 
and Schmitter 1999; Regini 2000; and Rhodes 1998). Overall, this requires attention to 
how these four alternative approaches to post-Fordist restructuring are combined in 
“actually existing” strategies or projects and, in particular, how different approaches may 
acquire different weights at different scales within the same strategy or project. There is 
certainly no good reason to expect the same broad approach to dominate at all levels, 
and there are several good reasons why more complex and complicated pictures might 
emerge. 
 
Neoliberalism and Cities  
Some of the implications of neoliberalism for cities (and some of the above-noted 
complications) can be discerned in a recent report entitled World Report on the Urban 
Future 21 (World Report 2000). This is a specially prepared report that was written by a 
distinguished fourteen-member “World Commission” moderated by Sir Peter Hall, the 
renowned professor of urban planning, and serviced by Ulrich Pfeiffer, a professional 
urban planning consultant, for Urban21. Urban21 was a prestigious international 
conference held in Berlin in June 2000, sponsored by the German government, with 
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additional support from the governments of Brazil, South Africa, and Singapore. The 
world commissioners who prepared the report are drawn from “the great and the good” 
and have been involved in a range of public, parastatal, professional, and private 
activities. Allowing for some overlap in experience and positions, they included: 
academic policy entrepreneurs, mayors, an ambassador, a vice president and ex–vice 
president of the World Bank, a senior civil servant, architects, jurists, ministers, senior 
UN officials, former parliamentary deputies, and leaders of national and international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Sponsors of some of the conference symposia 
included international producer service firms, a major software house, a construction 
firm, and a major German regional bank. Whilst no single report should be taken as 
wholly representative of current thinking on urban governance, this one does provide 
some useful insights into the naturalization of neoliberalism and its implications for 
sustainable cities in an era of the globalizing, knowledge-driven economy. It has since 
been published in book form as Hall and Pfeiffer (2000).2 
All four of the above-noted distinctive features of the SWPR are clearly 
discernible in the World Report, even though they are not fully examined. Of special 
interest for present purposes is how these features are related to cities and their future. 
First, cities are clearly regarded as engines of economic growth, key centers of 
economic, political, and social innovation, and key actors in promoting and consolidating 
international competitiveness. Moreover, with the transition to a postindustrial era, the 
rise of the knowledge-driven economy, and the increasing importance of the information 
society with its requirements for lifelong learning, cities are seen as even more 
important drivers for innovation and competitiveness than before. Admittedly, the 
authors identify different types of cities—based on informal hypergrowth, based on 
dynamic innovation and learning, or the declining cities of an outmoded Fordist model of 
growth—and recommend different responses for each. However, these represent 
different adaptations of the overall neoliberal program to the same set of challenges. 
Second, in line with the familiar neoliberal critique, welfare states are seen as 
costly, overburdened, inefficient, incapable of eliminating poverty, overly oriented to 
cash entitlements rather than empowerment, and so on. The report argues that, where it 
already exists, the welfare state should be dismantled in favor of policies that 
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emphasize moving people from welfare into work, that link social and labor market 
policy, and that provide incentives to learn and/or prepare for a new job. Likewise, 
where they have not yet developed, welfare states should be firmly discouraged. 
Instead, arrangements should be instituted to encourage family, neighborhood, informal, 
or market-based and market-sustaining solutions to the problems of social reproduction. 
States should not attempt to provide monopoly services but should contract them out or 
at least introduce internal competition. In hypergrowth cities, for example, this translates 
into a call to revalorize the informal economy and/or the social economy and 
neighborhood support mechanisms as a means of tackling social exclusion. In more 
dynamic or mature cities, the report (2000) recommends other projects to produce 
“active and productive citizens” who will not burden the state or demand entitlements 
without accepting corresponding responsibilities. Thus, education and informal self-help 
are the key to survival and sustainability and, in principle, education should be made 
available to all. Cities should develop their stock of indigenous “human capital” and their 
local labor markets in order to promote local well-being as well as international 
competitiveness. 
Third, the World Report clearly recognizes the emerging crisis of the national 
scale of economic, political, and social organization, the increased importance of the 
global level (especially in the form of a still emerging “single global urban network” that 
cross-cuts national borders), and the resurgence of the local and regional levels. Its 
response is to promote the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity. Problems should be 
resolved at the lowest level possible, but with capacity-building and financial support 
from the national administration. This requires integrated action between various levels 
of government, with an appropriate allocation of responsibilities and resources. 
Unsurprisingly, the report envisages a key role for cities in managing the interface 
between the local economy and global flows, between the potentially conflicting 
demands of local sustainability and local well-being and those of international 
competitiveness, and between the challenges of social exclusion and global polarization 
and the continuing demands for liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and so on.  
Fourth, there is a strong emphasis on partnership and networks rather than top-
down national government. Thus, in addition to subsidiarity and solidarity across 
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different scales of economic, political, and social organization, the report also calls for 
partnership between the public and private sectors and between government and civil 
society. Public-private partnerships should nonetheless work with the grain of market 
forces, not against it. In addition, partnerships should involve not only actors from the 
private economic sector but also NGOs, religious groups, community-action groups, or 
networks among individuals. Promoting partnerships requires a retreat of the state 
(especially at national level) so that it can do well what it alone can do. Nonetheless, the 
latter tasks do include steering partnerships and moderating their mutual relations in the 
interests of “the maximum welfare of all the people.” This is reflected in the World 
Report’s (2000) call for “good governance, seen as an integrated effort on the part of 
local government, civil society and the private sector.”  
In noting how the World Report fits in with the neoliberal project, I am not arguing 
that its principal authors, the commissioners, their professional, academic, and lay 
consultants, or the principal speakers at the Urban21 conference are necessarily 
conscious agents of neoliberalism in either its initial “red in tooth and claw” version or its 
current “Third Way” variant. Some may be; others are not. More important for my 
purposes is how this document implicitly endorses neoliberalism in the ways it describes 
recent economic and political changes, ascribes responsibility for them, and prescribes 
solutions for the problems they create. In this sense, it is a deeply ideological document 
and contributes to the “New World Order” by sharing in a “new word order”  (Luke 1994: 
613-615). For ideology is most effective when ideological elements are invisible, 
operating as the background assumptions which lead the text producer to “textualize” 
the world in a particular way and lead interpreters to interpret the text in a particular way 
(Fairclough 1989:85). 
Indeed, alongside its diagnosis of the various failures of previous modes of 
economic growth and urban governance in different types of city, said in each case to 
justify neoliberalism, the World Report (2000) recognizes that neoliberalism has its own 
limits and also generates major social tensions. Its authors accept the recently 
perceived need to re-embed neoliberalism in society, to make it more acceptable 
socially and politically, and to ensure that it is environmentally sustainable. Here, 
Polanyi lives! Yet they make as few concessions as possible to the forces that oppose 
 17 
the program, protagonists, and driving forces of neoliberalism. Hence, the World Report 
also identifies and advocates different sets of strategies to support and complement the 
neoliberal project in different regions and/or types of cities. Its proposals for the 
informal, weakly regulated, and vulnerable hypergrowth cities of the developing world 
combine neoliberalism with a strong emphasis on mobilizing popular energies, the 
informal or social economy, and communitarian values. In these cities, then, it ascribes 
a key role to neocommunitarianism in sustaining neoliberalism. In contrast, no such 
dilution is recommended for the mature but declining cities of the Atlantic Fordist 
regions: they must take their neoliberal medicine. A different prescription again is 
offered for the dynamic cities of East Asia. This comprises a mix of neoliberalism with 
public-private partnerships to improve the infrastructure and policy environment for 
international as well as local capital. Here the developmental state is allowed to remain 
proactive, provided that it is rescaled and becomes more open to world-market forces. 
In no case is there a challenge to the wisdom of the “accumulated knowledge and 
experience” noted by the World Report that market forces provide the best means to 
satisfy human wants and desires and that, provided they are steered in the right 
direction through good governance, they can also solve the most pressing problems 
facing humankind in the new century. 
 
Naturalizing Neoliberalism 
The World Report (2000) also illustrates another key feature of neoliberalism. The 
latter’s success depends on promoting new ways of representing the world, new 
discourses, new subjectivities that establish the legitimacy of the market economy, the 
disciplinary state, and enterprise culture. The language of the World Report shares in 
this tendency to naturalize the global neoliberal project, most notably in its concern with 
renewing and consolidating neoliberal principles at the urban scale. Thus, the many 
changes associated with this project are variously represented in the World Report as 
natural, spontaneous, inevitable, technological, and demographic. It takes technological 
change and globalization as given, depersonalizes them, fetishizes market forces, and 
fails to mention the economic, political, and social forces that drive these processes.  
Moreover, the very same processes that cause the problems identified in the 
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report will also solve them: technological change will provide solutions to emerging 
problems, democratization will occur, population growth will decline, economic growth 
will continue, the informal sector will expand to deal with social problems. No one could 
infer from the report that technological change and globalization are deeply politicized 
processes and objects of struggles within the dominant classes, within states, and 
within civil society. Instead, it presumes an equality of position in relation to these 
changes: they are objective and inevitable, we must adapt to them. Thus, whereas 
globalization, technological change, and competition are depersonalized, human 
agency enters in through the need for survival and sustainability. It is, above all, local 
communities, women, and workers who must adapt to these impersonal forces. They 
must be flexible, empower themselves, take control of their pensions by self-funding 
them, undertake lifelong learning, put democratic pressure on urban administrations to 
support their informal initiatives, and so on. Likewise, cities can become competitive, 
take control of their economic destinies, develop their local markets, especially the 
localized labor markets, their local infrastructure and their stock of housing, develop 
good governance, and become attractive places for working and living. Moreover, on 
the rare occasions where blame is attributed for economic and social problems, it tends 
to be localized. Thus, urban poverty results not so much from capitalism as from 
ineffective local administration—which a judicious combination of mobilization from 
below and capacity-building from above can correct. 
The World Report (2000) contains no analysis of capitalism and its agents. The 
dynamic of the knowledge-driven economy is described in objective, factual terms. The 
report contains only one reference to “the present economic system” (undefined), and 
this admits that it is massively suboptimal and inefficient—but does not pause to ask why. 
The only economic actors it identifies are local urban networks of small-scale producers 
and service, small firms, private companies, and (clearly benign) “world-class 
companies.” The only capital identified is human capital. The only social actors are: 
people around the world with shared or common aspirations; the weak, the old, and the 
young; the rich and the poor; women; families; informal neighborhood support networks; 
and members of civil society. The only political actors mentioned are urban leaders, 
citizens, and city administrations. There is no reference at all to the economic, political, 
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or ideological roles of multinational companies, transnational banks, strategic alliances 
among giant companies, the military-industrial complex, an emerging transnational 
class, the World Economic Forum, or the overall dynamic of capitalism. There is no 
reference to popular movements, new social movements, grass-roots struggles, trade 
unions, or even political parties—good governance is, apparently, above party politics. 
Also unmentioned are the crucial roles of the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Trade 
Organization, and other international economic agencies; and the efforts of the US and 
its allies to promote globalization or redesign political and social institutions to 
underwrite and complement neoliberalism. Presumably, these must be left to operate 
above the national level (at which ultimate responsibility for social justice and 
redistribution is apparently to be located) and to define (technocratically) the framework 
within which cities pursue sustainable development. Pollution and environmental 
destruction appear to be facts of nature, rather than products of specific sets of social 
relations. The empowerment of women appears to be a key mechanism of social 
transformation, but patriarchy figures nowhere as a mechanism of domination or 
oppression—and neither states nor firms, neither political nor business leaders, seem to 
have vested interests in sustaining it. 
In short, here is a text that simulates egalitarianism (that of a “we,” a collectivity 
of individuals, families, and communities all equally confronted with objective, inevitable 
changes and challenges) and lacks any explicit reference to power and authority, 
exploitation and domination. It is no surprise, then, that these challenges can be met in 
ways that will reconcile international competitiveness with local autonomy, economic 
growth with sustainability, market forces with quality of life, the needs of the highly 
skilled with the economic development of the entire city. This harmonization of 
contradictions and antagonisms is to be achieved at the urban level through a rallying of 
the good and the great, the movers and shakers, the rich and the poor, shanty dwellers 
and property capital, men and women, to the banner of “good governance.” And that 
they will so rally is, it appears, assured through the same “accumulated knowledge and 
experience” that has recognized the virtues of multidimensional sustainable development. 
Adequate forms of urban governance are thus central to securing the neoliberal project as 
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it is pursued in different forms and to different degrees in different local, regional, national, 
and transnational contexts. 
 
Conclusion 
This sort of search for a new spatiotemporal fix for neoliberalism is unsurprising, for 
attempts to spread the neoliberal economic project globally have experienced major 
setbacks in recent years. This is especially clear in the massive failure of the militant 
free-marketeers’ initial neoliberal project to promote radical system transformation in 
postsocialist societies. Despite a very steep learning curve and substantial foreign 
support, there is still no successful paradigmatically neoliberal regime in the ex-Soviet 
bloc. Likewise, in the case of the attempt to impose neoliberal regime shifts in East Asia 
and Latin America, failure is evident in unexpected financial and industrial crises and a 
financial contagion that threatened to spread through an increasingly integrated world 
market. In the neoliberal regime shifts in the former heartlands of Atlantic Fordism, 
failure can be seen in unexpected social costs with serious political repercussions, such 
as growing economic polarization and social exclusion rather than the promised “trickle-
down” effects of liberated market forces. In addition, countries that embarked on 
neoliberal policy adjustment did not move on to a neoliberal regime shift, but instead 
sought alternative paths of economic, social, and political restructuring. More generally, 
new forms of resistance have developed on a global scale (eg the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investments, Seattle, Genoa). 
Although such setbacks have not triggered a major reversal of the global 
neoliberal project, they have led many key protagonists to re-evaluate strategies and 
tactics. This explains the growing concern with how best to present the project, to co-
ordinate actions to promote and consolidate it on different scales, to manage its social 
and environmental costs and their adverse political repercussions, and to identify and 
pursue flanking measures that would help to re-embed the recently liberated market 
forces into a well-functioning market society. If getting the international institutional 
architecture and international regimes right is one key aspect of attempts to stabilize 
neoliberalism, intervention at the urban scale is equally essential, because this is where 
neoliberalism has its most significant economic, political, and social impacts on 
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everyday life. Whether or not such projects will succeed is another matter. I have 
already advanced some general reasons why the various modes of governance 
associated with capitalism all tend to encounter contradictions, tensions, and obstacles. 
Only time and struggles will tell whether sufficient flanking and supporting measures can 
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Figure 1. Forms of Neo-Liberalism 
 
       Policy-Adjustment Modulation of policies to improve performance of  
an accumulation regime and mode of regulation 
       Regime Shift            Paradigm shift in accumulation and regulation,  
introducing new economic and political principles  
      Radical System Neo-liberalism as strategy for moving from state  
      Transformation socialism to capitalist social formation 
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 Neo-Liberalism 
1.  Liberalization – promote free competition 
2.  De-regulation – reduce role of law and state 
3.  Privatization – sell off public sector 
4.  Market proxies in residual public sector 
5.  Internationalization – free inward and outward flows 
6.  Lower direct taxes – increase consumer choice 
Neo-statism  
1.  From state control to regulated competition  
2.  Guide national strategy rather than plan top-down  
3.  Auditing performance of private and public sectors 
4.  Public-Private partnerships under state guidance 
5.  Neo-mercantilist protection of core economy 
6.  Expanding role for new collective resources 
Neo-corporatism  
1. Re-balance competition and cooperation 
2. De-centralized 'regulated self-regulation' 
3. Widen range of private, public, and other 'stakeholders' 
4. Expand role of public-private partnerships 
5. Protect core economic sectors in open economy  
6. High taxation to finance social investment 
  Neo-communitarianism  
1.  De-Liberalization – limit free competition 
2.  Empowerment – enhance role of third sector  
3.  Socialization – expand the social economy 
4.  Emphasis on social use-value and social cohesion 
5.  Fair trade not Free trade,  Think Global, Act Local 
6.  Redirect taxes – citizens' wage, carers' allowances 
 
Figure 2. Strategies to Promote or Adjust to Global Neo-Liberalism 
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Notes 
 
1 I use the concept of “formal freedom” here to draw an implicit contrast with the lack of 
full substantive freedom due to the multiple constraints that limit free choice. The 
institutionalization of formal freedom is nonetheless a significant political 
accomplishment and a major element in liberal citizenship, as well as a precondition for 
market economies. 
2 This report provoked a response from a Berlin-based tenants’ organization, drawing 
on its own range of national and international policymakers, advisors, and academic 
experts, which attempted to denaturalize what the World Report attempted to naturalize. 
See Eick and Berg (2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
